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1Abstract.
The resort to utility-theoretical issues will permit us to propose a constructive proce-
dure for deriving a homogeneous of degree one, continuous function that gives raise to
a primitive demand function under suitably mild conditions. This constitutes the ¯rst
elementary proof of a necessary and su±cient condition for an integrability problem to
have a solution by continuous (subjective utility) functions.
Such achievement reinforces the relevance of a technique that was succesfully formalized
in Alcantud and Rodr¶ ³guez-Palmero [3]. The analysis of these two works exposes deep
relationships between two apparently separate ¯elds: mathematical utility theory and the
revealed preference approach to the integrability problem.
JEL classi¯cation: D11
Key words: Strong Axiom of Homothetic Revelation; revealed preference; continuous
homogeneous of degree one utility; integrability of demand.
21 Introduction
In this work we intend to defend the validity of a procedural proposal for solving problems
in a realm with far-reaching implications, but whose development hinges on a number of
varied and highly complex techniques. We purpose showing that there are close links
between two apparently disconnected branches of the literature, that permit to derive
a powerful yet simple way to approach a rather obscure though trascendental bulk of
economic knowledge.
The general setting where we can frame our study is the search for answers to two
main questions. In the ¯rst place: what does the neoclassical model of consumer behavior
(consumers' choices are described as deriving from maximizing a utility, or perhaps only
a preference, subject to a budget constraint) impose on observed, actual behavior? The
approach followed by the authors above originates in classical works by Samuelson [25],
[26] and involves algebraic conditions on the demand functions that relate to the maxi-
mizing pattern of behavior. A quite di®erent approach is exempli¯ed by the pioneering
work of Antonelli [4] and Slutsky [28], where the derivatives of the demand function have
a preeminent role.
Conversely, the integrability problem consists of explaining observed demand according
to that model. The two approaches above provide di®erent insights into that question,
which are exempli¯ed e.g. in, on the one hand -revealed preference-, Uzawa [31], Stigum
[30] or Mas-Colell [22], and, on the other hand -integrability theory-, Hurwicz and Uzawa
[16]. The (partial) answers provided by a number of well-known classical studies are
highly ellaborated, technical, and lengthy when (semi)continuous utilities are involved,
which caused a signi¯cant number of corrections and arguments in the specialized litera-
ture. Perhaps the only elementary approaches to the problem are Sondermann [29], which
inspires on Hurwicz and Richter [15], as well as Alcantud and Rodr¶ ³guez-Palmero [3], that
inspires on both works. Neither of them reaches full continuity of the subjective utilities
that explain the demand; nor have they provided necessary and su±cient conditions. The
novelty there was the use of techniques that arise from mathematical utility theory. That
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proposal is explicited in order to bene¯t most from the appeal to arguments from utility
theory. That method consists of (a) transforming the integrability question into one
of representability of the revealed preference by weak utilities, and then (b) study this
naturally associated binary relation in order to check that it does admit adequate (e.g.
semicontinuous) utilities. This systematized approach permitted to give simple and gene-
ral answers to the integrability problem under research, gaining insight into the nature of
the topic and obtaining Sondermann's result as a corollary, as well as other new su±cient
conditions for integrability of the demand.
The success of that proposal is not restricted to those achievements regarding the
general problem, and of course it might eventually lead to full characterizations in spe-
ci¯c realms. That possibility is essentially vetoed in the initial problem, as the negative
example in the appendix of Mas-Colell [22] shows; nonetheless, necessary and su±cient
conditions for integrability by continuous functions for a class of demand functions that
satisfy a list of widely-used axioms is achieved in Fuchs-Seliger [14].
In particular, in recent years there has been a renewed interest in, on the one hand, the
structure of homothetic preferences -Dow and Werlang [12], Maccheroni [20]- and their
relationship with homogeneous representations of them -Candeal and Indur¶ ain [9], Bosi,
Candeal and Indur¶ ain [7], Liu and Wong [19, Appendix A]-; and, on the other hand, di-
®erent issues around the representability of demand functions by homothetic preferences
or homogeneous (subjective) utilities -Knoblauch [18], Liu and Wong [19]-. Applications
justify the interest in the homothetic case. Castagnoli and Maccheroni [10] digress on
the relevance of homothetic preferences in non-expected utility theories. The fact that
we can deduce the agent's entire preference from a single indi®erence class simpli¯es the
analysis of a good number of problems (e.g. of econometric nature) and justi¯es the wide
use of special types of homothetic preferences (e.g. in the theories of price and quantity
indices). The demand functions that derive from homothetic preferences are homothetic
of degree one in income, which are those demand funtions for which the strong axiom of
revealed preference aggregates by a ¯xed distribution of income (cf. Shafer [27, pp. 1177-
48]) when they satisfy the budget equality. With respect to representability of demand by
homogeneous functions or, more generally, by homothetic preferences, a key reference is
Liu and Wong [19]. It solves the problem quite in full, being especially remarkable as the
authors realize that, whithin an axiomatic framework where all utilities are homogeneous
of degree one, necessary and su±cient conditions for continuous integrability can be given
under very mild assumptions -something virtually unreachable in the general setting, as
we have argued above. However, their technique is extremely ellaborated, involving ¯rst-
order predicate languages and extensions of ¯elds, which are not in the toolkit of the
average researcher in Economics. The Strong Axiom of Homothetic Revelation (SHA)
that Liu and Wong introduce is their main analytical tool, and probably deserves further
attention. Previously, a quite similar solution to the problem had been achieved in Fuchs-
Seliger [13] along her study of aggregation properties of demand functions under a ¯xed
distribution of income.
The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we propose an elementary approach to the
problem of representing a consumer's demand by means of an homogeneous function. Our
procedure is constructive, in contrast with the highly abstract technique available so far.
In order to do so, we ¯rst need to put forward some technical, auxiliary results that concern
the representability of homothetic preferences, and only after this preliminary analysis we
will focus on the particular case of the preference revealed by a demand function. The
¯nal result will consist of a constructive procedure to derive a homogeneous of degree one
and continuous function that gives raise to a given demand function under suitably mild
new conditions.
Secondly, we value the conclusion that the resort to purely utility-theoretical issues in
order to implement new technical results in the research into the integrability problem
is proving to be quite succesful and promising. A di®erent token in support of this
research scheme is the application of the results in Alcantud and Rodr¶ ³guez-Palmero [2]
into Alcantud and Rodr¶ ³guez-Palmero [3]. These successes might well boost the interest in
fundamental questions involving integrability of demand functions and their relationship
with utility-oriented problems, raising new answers from a di®erent perspective. The
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original problem: we stress that the homogeneous case displays a very rich collection of
properties and therefore leaves room to a quite elegant and appealing solution.
We distribute this research as follows. Section 2 focuses on the technical results that
will be needed in order to solve the integrability question under inspection. Some relevant
issues on the properties of the revealed homothetic preference, as well as the implications
of the SHA, will be an intermediate stage from which there will be much to gain in the ¯nal
part of the paper; we accomplish that task in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 integrates all
these di®erent steps, furnishing a constructive solution to the representability questions we
have announced above; Theorems 2 and 3 culminate the technical research. In our view,
their intrinsic relevance consists in that this is the ¯rst necessary and su±cient condition
for an integrability problem to have a solution by continuous functions whose proof is
elementary. We summarize the consequences of our research and some of its possible
implications in Section 5. An Appendix contains the proofs of the auxiliary results.
2 Homogeneous and continuous weak utilities
In this Section we are concerned with the existence of a homogeneous of degree one and
continuous weak utility for an acyclic binary relation on a real cone in a topological real
vector space. To the best of our knowledge, such a topic was not previously considered
in the literature. However, Bosi, Candeal and Indur¶ ain [7] presented a characterization
of the existence of a homogeneous of degree one and continuous utility function for a
complete preorder on a real cone in a topological real vector space. Also recently, Bosi and
Zuanon [8] provided an axiomatization of the existence of a nonnegative, homogeneous
of degree one and continuous order-preserving function for a not necessarily complete
preorder. Further, the representation of an interval order by means of two nonnegative,
homogeneous of degree one and semicontinuous real-valued functions was considered in
Bosi [6]. We recall that a full axiomatization of the existence of an upper semicontinuous
weak utility for an acyclic binary relation on a topological space was presented by Alcantud
6and Rodr¶ ³guez-Palmero [2].
Our main tool will be the following theorem, where we present a characterization of
the existence of a homogeneous of degree one and (upper-semi)continuous weak utility for
an acyclic binary relation Â on a real cone in a topological real vector space. Afterwards,
a technical ad-hoc Corollary will yield the particular su±cient condition which will be
the key to yield an application to representing demand functions. Before that, we shall
explicit the de¯nitions involved.
A binary relation Â on a set X is said to be acyclic if x1 Â x2 Â ::: Â xn implies x1 6= xn
for all x1;:::;xn 2 X. Given an acyclic binary relation Â on a set X, we shall denote by
Â Â the transitive closure of Â (i.e., x Â Â y if and only if there exist x1;:::;xn 2 X such
that x = x1 Â x2 Â ::: Â xn = y), which is a partial order (i.e., it is irre°exive and
transitive). A subset A of a set X endowed with an acyclic binary relation Â is said to be
a lower set if y Â x and y 2 A imply x 2 A. An acyclic binary relation Â on a topological
space X is said to be tc-upper semicontinuous if fz 2 X : x Â Â zg is an open set for every
x 2 X, i.e. if its transitive closure is upper semicontinuos.
If A is any subset of a real vector space A, then de¯ne, for every real number t,
tA = ftx : x 2 Ag. We recall that a real cone X in a topological real vector space E is a
subset of E such that tx 2 X for every x 2 X and t 2 R++. An acyclic binary relation on
a real cone X in a topological real vector space E is said to be homothetic if x Â y implies
tx Â ty for every x;y 2 X and t 2 R++. A real-valued function ' : X ¡! R on the real
cone X is homogeneous of degree one if '(¸x) = ¸'(x) for every x 2 X and ¸ > 0.
A weak utility for an acyclic binary relation Â on a set X is a real-valued function u
on X such that u(x) > u(y) for all x;y 2 X with x Â y.
THEOREM 1 Let Â be an acyclic binary relation on a real cone X in a topological
real vector space E. Then the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) There exists a homogeneous of degree one and continuous weak utility u
for Â









(b) q < r implies Gq µ Gr for all q;r 2 Q (C is the topological closure of C);
(c) qGr = Gqr for every r 2 Q and q 2 Q++;
(d) for every x;y 2 X such that x ÂÂ y there exist r1;r2 2 Q such that
r1 > r2, x 62 Gr1, y 2 Gr2.
Proof: see the Appendix.
REMARK 1 If we seek upper semicontinuity only, then the conditions that charac-
terize existence are (a), (b0) q < r implies Gq µ Gr for all q;r 2 Q, (c) and (d). This is
quite immediate from the proof above.
The importance of semicontinuity in replacement of full continuity has been enhanced
e.g. by Alcantud [1], among others, as an alternative to permitting to obtain optimality
results under less restrictive conditions; the theoretical basis of this statement is enunciated
e.g. in Berge [5], p. 76.
In subsequent Sections we will show that certain demand functions have an intrinsic
structure that permits us to derive them from homogeneous of degree one and continuous
functions. In order to ease this task, we intend to provide ¯rst a technical result that will
be of application to that context. That preliminary result is the next Corollary.
COROLLARY 1 Let Â be a tc-upper semicontinuous and homothetic acyclic binary
relation on a real cone X in a topological real vector vector space E, and assume that the
following conditions hold:
(i) for each non-minimal element x 2 X, and for each y 2 X, there is r > 0
rational such that rx Â Â y;
(ii) whenever x Â Â y, and for each ¸ 2 (0;1), then x Â Â ¸y.
8Then there is a homogeneous of degree one, upper semicontinuous weak utility u for Â.
Suppose further
(iii) there is x 2 X that is not minimal for Â and such that G1 = fa 2 X : x Â Â
ag satis¯es: for each q > 1 rational, G1 µ qG1.
Then, there exists a homogeneous of degree one, continuous weak utility u for Â.
Proof: see the Appendix.
REMARK 2 Note that, provided that the primitive sets Gr are known, the proofs
above are constructive and yield a computable utility u(x). This observation will be key
in order to justify that our ¯nal result on homogeneous representability of demand is not
only an existence proof but it is also constructive.
3 Revealed preference and homotheticity
In this Section we will perform an ad-hoc study of some questions related to concepts
involved in the search of a solution to the homogeneous representablity problem. Formally,
this is a preliminary stage, since we necessarily must have homothetic preferences that
induce a given demand if a homogeneous of degree one function is to explain that demand
function. In order to separate what depends on properties speci¯c of the demand from
what corresponds to general properties of more abstract models, we place ourselves in the
general framework of choice structures ¯rst.
Therefore, let us ¯x a choice structure on a given set X , that is, a pair (B;c) where B
is a collection of nonempty subsets of X and c : B ¡! X is a correspondence such that
? 6= c(B) µ B for all B 2 B. We say that the structure has univalued choices if c(B) is
a singleton for each B 2 B. Also, X will be a cone of a real vector space. This context
permits to de¯ne the homotheticity of R binary relation on X. That concept means that
x R y implies (¸x) R (¸y) for each ¸ > 0. Unless otherwise stated, all choice structures
will be univalued along this Section.
9If y 6= x and there is a B 2 B such that y 2 B and x 2 c(B) then we say that x
is directly revealed preferred to y , and we write xS y (cf. Samuelson (1938, 1950)). If
there is a B 2 B such that y 2 B and x 2 c(B) then we say that x is (weakly) revealed
preferred to y , and we write xV y (cf. Clark [11], Hurwicz and Richter [15], p. 60). Let
F be de¯ned by: xFy if and only if there is ¸ > 0 with ¸xV ¸y. Then, F will be called
the homothetic closure of the (weak) revealed preference V (the homothetic closure H of
S is de¯ned in Liu and Wong [19], p. 291).
It is easy to check that xH y if and only if (xF y and x 6= y). By construction, H
extends S and F extends V . Because V extends S -actually, xS y if and only if (xV y
and x 6= y)-, F must extend H too.
For later use, we introduce:
WHA xF y ) y S x false
the weak axiom of revealed homothetic preference.
The choice structure (B;c) on X is representable if there exists a function u : X ¡! R
such that c(B) = fx 2 B : u(x) > u(y) for all y 2 Bg, for any B 2 B.
We say that the choice structure (B;c) on X is rationalizable if there exists a preference
(i.e. complete, transitive binary relation) < such that c(B) = fx 2 B : x < y for all y 2
Bg, for any B 2 B. Obviously, representability implies rationalizability. Observe that
univaluedness of c yields (a) xS y implies x Â y, and therefore S is acyclic; and (b)
c(B) = fx 2 B : x Â y for all y 2 B n fxgg, for any B 2 B. Acyclicity of S constitutes
Houthakker's Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP). Furthermore, this axiom
implies Samuelson's Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP), which amounts to S
being asymmetric. Moreover, it is well known that any of WARP or SARP implies that
choices must be univalued, and that SARP is equivalent to rationalization (cf. Richter
[23], also Richter [24], Corollary 1).
We next enunciate some fundamental properties that a®ect homothetic rationalizabil-
ity. Given a multivalued choice structure on a cone of a real vector space X that is
10rationalizable by a homothetic preference <:
Property 1. It is clear that < must extend V , F, and obviously the transitive closure
F ¤ of F (which is transitive itself). The same can be said about S, H and the transitive
closure H¤ of H (which is transitive as well); the latter being a fact that is mentioned in
Remark 1 (a) of Liu and Wong [19].
Property 2. The homothetic closure F of the (weak) revealed preference V rationalizes
it. That is, for any ¯xed B 2 B, we show that c(B) = fx 2 B : xF y for all y 2 Bg. It is
clear that x 2 c(B) yields xV y and then xF y for all y 2 B. Let us take now x 2 B with
xF y for every y 2 B. Assume, by way of contradiction, x 62 c(B); equivalently, there is
z 2 c(B) and thus z 6= x obviously. Then z Â x while x < z -because < extends F and
xF z-, a contradiction.
Turning back to the univalued case, we shall denote by xB the only element in c(B).
Then, we have further consequences:
Property 3. The following SHA holds:
xH
¤ y ) y S x false
This latter condition holds because xH¤ y implies x < y (see Property 1) and this is not
compatible with y S x (and thus with y Â x due to the univaluedness of c).
For certain demand functions on Rl
+, Theorem 1 of Liu and Wong [19] prove that SHA
is su±cient for rationalizability by homothetic preferences too. The technique they use
stems from Richter [24] and Kannai [17], and appeals to ¯rst-order predicate languages.
That issue has been used by Liu and Wong to argue in favour of the empirical relevance
of the H relation -cf. their Remark 1 (b)-, which is observable as long as choices are. The
same kind of argument follows after the latter properties with regard to either V or F.
Observe that the SHA axiom is de¯ned in Liu and Wong [19] as acyclicity of H, which
is equivalent to the de¯nitions above. Also, Property 3 is mentioned in Theorem 1 of Liu
and Wong [19] for a particular context.
11It is trivial that any of SHA or WHA forces choices to be univalued.
Moreover, SHA is stronger than WHA. For, under SHA, it is easy to show that any
pair x;y 2 X such that xF y can not satisfy y S x. If x = y, this is obvious. Otherwise,
because xH y and then xH¤ y, the SHA says y S x false.
It is also true that WHA implies WARP. For, under WHA, it is easy to show that S
is asymmetric. Indeed, for any pair x;y 2 X such that xS y, because necessarily xF y it
follows that y S x must be false.
Besides, SHA implies SARP. For, under SHA, it is easy to show that S is acyclic. In-
deed, for any possible cycle x1;:::;xn 2 X such that x1 S ::::S xn S x1, because necessarily
x1 H ::::H xn (i.e. x1 H¤ xn) it follows that xn S x1 should be false, a contradiction.
Property 4. H rationalizes the structure, in the sense that c(B) = fx 2 B : xH y for all y 2
B;y 6= xg. Let us ¯x B 2 B. It is plain that c(B) = fx 2 B : xF y for all y 2 Bg µ
fx 2 B : xH y for all y 2 B;y 6= xg. Besides, given x 2 B such that xH y whenever
y 2 B n fxg, forcefully x = xB. Otherwise xH xB H x and thus x » xB (because <
extends H), contradicting the univaluedness of choice due to x;xB 2 c(B) = fx 2 B :
x < y for all y 2 Bg. In short, c(B) = fx 2 B : xH y for all y 2 B;y 6= xg.
Yet another interesting theoretical result that builds on Property 3 is included in the
Appendix for the topic's sake, since it is of little use when demand is studied.
4 Homogeneous representability of demand
In this ¯nal Section we apply the techniques we have developed before in order to ¯nd
necessary and su±cient conditions for certain demand functions to be explained as the
result of optimizing a continuous, homogeneous of degree one function (subjective utility).
As we have announced, the basis to do with this approach will be Corollary 1 to our
characterization of the existence of homogeneous and continuous weak utilities. First of
all, we shall engage in a thorough study of the structure of such demand functions in order
12to be enabled to check that the corresponding assumptions hold.
The following context will be assumed in the remaining of this Section. X will denote
a ¯xed consumption set (the non-negative orthant of Rn for some n). We adopt the
usual notation for vector prices p = (p1;:::;pn), income w and budget sets B(p;w) =
fx 2 X : p ¢ x 6 wg. B will be the collection of non-empty budget sets of X associated
with the subset of price-income pairs P £ M = Rn
++ £ (0;+1). Let h be a demand
function on B, that is, a function that selects exactly one element (denoted by h(p;w)
or by h(B)) for each B = B(p;w) 2 B.
Let us ¯x an arbitrary B0 = B(p0;w0), and denote by x0 the only element in h(B0).
Then, the following list of properties hold:
(1) For all t 2 (0;1): x0 S (tx0). Therefore, q;r > 0 and r > q imply (rx0)H (q x0).
Proof: The ¯rst assertion is immediate: tx0 2 B(p0;w0) and fx0g = h(B0).
Concerning the second one: observe that x0 S (
q
r x0), and thus x0 H (
q
r x0) because H
extends S. Since H is homothetic by construction, (rx0)H (q x0).
(2) For all x 2 X, there is r 2 Q++ n f0g with (r x0)H x
Proof: If x = x0, the prior property proves the assertion: x0 S
x0
2 , and now (2x0)H x0
because H extends S and is homothetic.
If x 6= x0, but x 2 B0 = B(p0;w0), one has xS x0 and so xH x0.
Finally, if x 6= x0 and also x 62 B0 = B(p0;w0), there is r 2 Q, r 6= 0, such that
p0
x
r < w0 and x
r 6= x0. By construction, x0 S x
r, and now (rx0)H x.
(3) Given u : X ¡! R homogeneous of degree 1:
u generates h if and only if u is a weak utility for H
Proof: This result follows easily; it parallels Lemma 1 in Alcantud and Rodr¶ ³guez-
Palmero [3].
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in studying the behavior of all sets with a particular form. We keep p0 À 0 arbitrary
but ¯xed and, for simplicity, xw will denote the only element in h(p0;w) for each positive
price w. Let us denote Gw = fy 2 X : xwH¤yg, for each w > 0. It is plain that
B(p0;w) n fxwg µ Gw. We have:
(4) Grw = rGw for each r > 0
Proof: We only need to prove Grw µ rGw for each r > 0. The converse inclusion is
clearly immediate from that one (it requests that Gw µ 1
rGrw for each r > 0).
If y 2 Grw, then xrwH¤y by construction, therefore 1
rxrwH¤ 1
ry by homotheticity of H¤.
Because 1
rxrw 2 B(p0;w), it follows that xw S 1
rxrw H¤ 1
ry and so xw H¤ 1
ry. Thus, 1
ry 2 Gw
and y 2 rGw.
(5) For every w > 0 income, y 2 Gw implies ¸y 2 Gw for each ¸ 2 (0;1)
Proof: We ¯rst check the assertion that y 2 G1 implies ¸y 2 G1 for each ¸ 2 (0;1).
Because x1H¤y (x1 is the only element in h(p0;1)), for some x 2 X forcefully x1H¤xHy
by de¯nition of transitive closure (in case x1Hy we proceed with x = x1). Then, axS ay
for some a > 0 by construction, which means axS (a¸y) (because ¸(ay) is clearly available
in the same demand situation for which ax is chosen, being ay a®ordable). In conclusion,
x1H¤xH(¸y) and so x1H¤(¸y), which means by de¯nition that (¸y) 2 G1.
Now, for every w > 0 income, if y 2 Gw, then ¸y 2 Gw for each ¸ 2 (0;1). The reason
is that 1
wy 2 G1 because y 2 wG1 = Gw by Property (4), and then ¸
wy 2 G1 by the
previous assertion, yielding ¸y 2 wG1 = Gw.
(6) w > w0 > 0 implies Gw0 µ Gw
Proof: We know Gw0 = w0G1 µ wG1 = Gw.
The SHA is necessary for a demand function to be represented by a homogeneous of
degree 1 function (subjective utility), for in fact it is implied by homothetic rationalizabil-
ity alone. We want to investigate the implications of requesting that the demand behavior
14be consistent with that requirement. Therefore, and assuming SHA henceforth, we have
the following further properties:
(7) ¸xw 62 Gw for each ¸ > 1
Proof: Should there exist ¸ > 1 for which ¸xw 2 Gw, by (5) we would also have xw 2 Gw,
that is, xw H¤ xw. This contradicts acyclicity of H, i.e. SHA.
(8) h is exhaustive
Proof: Assume that, for the prices p0 (which were ¯xed but arbitrary), it is true that
there is an income w such that the demanded bundle xw satis¯es p0 ¢ xw < w.
We would then derive the existence of a ¸ > 1 for which ¸xw 2 B(p0;w), and therefore
xw S y by de¯nition of S. But this means ¸xw 2 Gw, against (7).
(9) S = H
Proof: Observe that, according to Remark 8 in Liu and Wong [19], because SHA holds
then the demand function h satis¯es h(p;¸w) = ¸h(p;w) for each ¸ > 0 and every
(p;w) 2 P £ M. This latter property easily yields homotheticity of S , that is to say,
S = H .
(10) If z 2 Gw and a 2 X satis¯es z > a (by this we mean: zi > ai for each component i)
then a 2 Gw.
Proof: There must be y 2 X with xwH¤yHz; should we have xwHz then we proceed
with y = xw. Because S = H, y = h(p;w) for some (p;w) 2 P £M that satis¯es pz 6 w.
But now pa < w, therefore y S a.
REMARK 3 For a given demand function, Liu and Wong [19] prove in their The-
orem 1 that it can be rationalized by a homothetic preference provided that SHA holds,
and conversely. It is, therefore, to be presumed that additional axioms must be introduced
in the model in order to obtain plain representability by homogeneous functions. We do
not know of any result in this fashion. However, Property (3) permits to characterize de-
15mand behavior that derives from a homogeneous (of degreee 1) function -subjective utility-
through SHA. We only need the purely numerical (i.e. without continuity) part of our
Theorem 1, since H will be acyclic under the SHA axiom and conversely. In our view,
this contribution is an anew result, but we leave this branch of the conclusions to the
interested reader.
Finally, an answer to the homogeneous representability problem follows from the next
property:
(11) Suppose that
xS y ) 9 B
0 = B(¹ p; ¹ w) 2 B such that
(
¹ p ¢ (tx + (1 ¡ t)y) 6 ¹ w for some t 2 (0;1);
xS h(B0):
Then H¤ is upper semicontinuous.
Proof: Observe that SARP was already assumed implicitely, for SHA holds by assump-
tion now.
Now the transitive closure of S is upper semicontinuous; that fact is guaranteed by
the proof of Proposition 2 in Alcantud and Rodr¶ ³guez-Palmero [3]. By (9), the transitive
closure of H, that is, H¤, is upper semicontinuous.
All the groundwork we have been performing before culminates in the following result
and the comments following it:
THEOREM 2 For any demand function that satis¯es the condition given in (11):
SHA is equivalent to the existence of a continuous, homogeneous of degree 1 function that
generates the demand.
Proof: Property 3 accounts for the necessary condition.
We now turn to the su±cient condition. Assume, therefore, that SHA holds. Due to
(3), we need an homogeneous of degree 1, continuous weak utility for H, i.e. for S because
of (9). By Corollary 1, we can assure the existence of the desired funtion. Note that S
16is acyclic by SHA and homothetic due to (9). Property (11) ensures that its transitive
closure H¤ is upper semicontinuous. The requirement (i) holds by (2). Property (5)
accounts for (ii): note that x not minimal means that x = xw = h(p;w) for some prices
p and income w, and then xH¤ y means simply y 2 Gw. So, we only need to check (iii),
that is, G1 µ qG1 for each q > 1 rational.
Fix q > 1 rational, and take x 2 G1. Because x > 1
qx, there is ² > 0 such that every
z 2 B(x;²)\X satis¯es z > 1
qx. But there must be z 2 B(x;²)\X \G1 because x 2 G1,
which forces 1
qx 2 G1 by (10). Therefore, x 2 qG1. ¤
In comparison to Theorem 3 in Liu and Wong [19], and putting aside the much di®er-
ent techniques involved, Theorem 2 presumes an assumption weaker than full continuity
in order to check that we can obtain continuous representability. The condition we have
used in (11) was presented in Alcantud and Rodr¶ ³guez-Palmero [3]. The relationship of
that requirement with respect to others that have proven useful in the literature is ex-
plained there in detail. In particular, continuous demand functions display that behavior.
Therefore, we get a sharpened consequence:
THEOREM 3 Given h demand function on X: it is continuous and satis¯es the SHA
if and only if it can be represented by a continuous, homogeneous of degree 1 function.
Proof: We only need to justify that, because homogeneous of degree 1 utilities induce
locally nonsatiated preferences on X, Proposition 3.AA.1 in Mas-Colell et al. [21] applies
and therefore the demand induced is continuous. ¤
175 Conclusion
Two related objectives of very di®erent nature are addressed in this contribution.
On the one hand, the extensive use of utility-theoretical techniques, as well as a deep
analysis of the structure of the homogeneous representability problem -all of them anew
and with intrinsic interest-, have permitted us to propose a constructive procedure for
deriving a homogeneous of degree one, continuous function giving raise to an original
demand function under mild conditions. As far as we know, this is the ¯rst elementary
proof of a necessary and su±cient condition for an integrability problem to have a solution
by continuous (subjective utility) functions.
Our thorough analysis has given place to several side remarks. Observe that, unlike
Liu and Wong, we made no assumption on the openness or ¯nitiness of the range of h
in our main theorems. Also, our demand functions were not initially requested to be
exhaustive, but we have observed in (8) that assuming SHA forces exhaustiveness, a fact
that seems to have gone unnoticed so far. Moreover, we have taken a further step by
observing that continuity of the demand was also necessary to have a solution; this was
due to the fact that continuous utilities inducing locally nonsatiated preferences on X
give raise to a continuous demand, provided that this demand is a function.
The constructive nature of our proof may have implications for subsequent purposes.
We must remark that the term constructive is used in the technical sense, and by no
means tries to imply that applying our method in practice must be straightforward.
Still, and in order to boost this potential applicability, we end this ¯rst comment brief-
ing the reader on the constructive procedure that computes a continuous, homogeneous
of degree 1 function that induces h, from the raw revealed preference S. Through either
S or its transitive clausure H¤ we check SHA, and then de¯ne G1 = fy 2 X : xwH¤yg
(associated with any ¯xed xw); now let
u(x) = inffr 2 Q : x 2 Grg
where Gr = rG1 for each r 2 Q, r > 0, and Gr = ? for each r 2 Q, r < 0. Corollary 1
18guarantees that this function is a continuous weak utility for S = H, and now (3) ensures
that it induces the demand.
On the other hand, the most challenging contribution, in our view, leans upon the
strong arguments we provided for an interesting debate. Indeed, we are of the opinion
that this work adds to a preliminary bulk of evidence of a fruitful relationship -already
hinted in the inspiring Alcantud and Rodr¶ ³guez-Palmero [3]- between mathematical utility
theory and revealed preference theory, yet to be explored in depth. The fact that this
relationship has already provided elementary answers to very deep problems with highly
complex solutions in the past literature may well motivate a growing interest in a very
promising tool for research into the integrability problem.
196 Appendix: proofs and a side result
Proof of Theorem 1: (i) ) (ii). Assume that there exists a homogeneous of degree
one and upper semicontinuous weak utility u for Â, and consider the countable fam-
ily fGrgr2Q = fx 2 X : u(x) < rgr2Q. It is clear that every Gr is an open lower
subset of X for every r 2 Q. Further, for every r 2 Q and q 2 Q++ we have that
qGr = qfx 2 X : u(x) < rg = fx 2 X : u(x) < qrg = Gqr since u is homogeneous of
degree one, and therefore condition (c) holds. Finally, it is easily seen that the family
fGrgr2Q satis¯es conditions (a), (b) and (d).
(ii) ) (i). Assume that there exists a countable family fGrgr2Q of open lower subsets
of X satisfying conditions (a), (b), (c) and (d). De¯ne a real-valued function u on X as
follows:
u(x) = inffr 2 Q : x 2 Grg:
First observe that u is well de¯ned by conditions (a) and (b) together. We claim that
u is a homogeneous of degree one and continuous weak utility for Â. Let us ¯rst show
that that u is upper semicontinuous. Consider any element x 2 X and any real number
® such that u(x) < ®. Then, from the de¯nition of u, there exists r 2 Q such that
u(x) < r < ®, x 2 Gr. Hence, Gr is an open lower set containing x such that u(z) < ®
for every z 2 Gr. In order to show that u is lower semicontinuous, let us ¯rst prove that
u(x) = inffr 2 Q : x 2 Grg for every x 2 X. It is clear that inffr 2 Q : x 2 Grg 6
inffr 2 Q : x 2 Grg for every x 2 X, since Gr µ Gr for every r 2 Q. Now assume
that there exists x 2 X with inffr 2 Q : x 2 Grg < inffr 2 Q : x 2 Grg. Consider
r1; r2 2 Q such that inffr 2 Q : x 2 Grg < r1 < r2 < inffr 2 Q : x 2 Grg. Then
x 2 Gr1, x 62 Gr2, and this is contradictory, since Gr1 µ Gr2 by the above condition (b).
So it must be inffr 2 Q : x 2 Grg = inffr 2 Q : x 2 Grg for every x 2 X. Now consider
any x 2 X, and any real number ® such that ® < u(x). Further, let r1;r2 2 Q++ be such
that ® < r1 < r2 < u(x). Then we have that x 62 Gr1 because otherwise x 2 Gr1 implies
x 2 Gr2 and this contradicts the fact that u(x) > r2. Hence, X nGr1 is an open subset of
20X containing x such that ® < u(z) for every z 2 X n Gr1 (observe that u(z) 6 ® implies
u(z) < r1 which in turn implies z 2 Gr1 since u(x) = inffr 2 Q : x 2 Grg for every
x 2 X).
Further, u is a weak utility for Â by condition (d). Indeed, for every x;y 2 X such that
x Â y there exist r1;r2 2 Q with r1 > r2, y 2 Gr2, x 62 Gr1 and therefore we have that
u(x) > r1 > r2 > u(y) from the de¯nition of u. In order to show that u is homogeneous
of degree one, assume that there exists t 2 R++ such that u(tx) < tu(x). Then, from the
de¯nition of u, there exists r 2 Q such that u(tx) < r < tu(x), tx 2 Gr. By continuity
of scalar multiplication and upper semicontinuity of u, there exists q 2 Q++ such that




q, and therefore we arrive at the contradiction qx 62 Gr. Analogously it can be
shown that for no t 2 R++, and x 2 X it is tu(x) < u(tx). So the proof is complete. ¤
Proof of Corollary 1: The case where all elements of X are minimal is trivial. Suppose,
therefore, that there is x 2 X that is not minimal respect to Â. De¯ne G1 = fa 2 X :
x Â Â ag, G¡1 = ?. Take Gq = qG1 for each q > 0 rational, and Gq = ? for each q 6 0
rational. These are open (by semicontinuity of Â Â) and lower (by homotheticity of Â and
therefore of Â Â) subsets. Let us ¯rst check that the collection fGqgq2Q satis¯es conditions
(a), (b0), (c) and (d) of Theorem 1 (see Remark 1) in order to ensure the existence of a
homogeneous of degree one, upper semicontinuous weak utility u for Â under (i) and (ii).
In order to verify that condition (a) of Theorem 1 holds, ¯x any x 2 X. Because there is
q > 0 rational such that qx Â Â x by (i), and Â Â is homothetic too, x Â Â x
q, which means
x
q 2 G1 or, equivalently, x 2 qG1 = Gq. Hence, we have that
[
r2Q
Gr = X. Furthermore,
\
r2Q
Gr = ? by construction.
Now let us prove that condition (b0) of Theorem 1 is veri¯ed (see Remark 1). Let us
¯x q < r 2 Q. Unless q;r > 0, assumption (b) holds trivially. Suppose, therefore, that
q;r > 0, and take an arbitrary element in Gq, that is, an element with the form qa where
a 2 G1. Because qa = r(
q
ra), in order to check qa 2 Gr = rG1 we only need to justify
21that
q
ra 2 G1. This fact derives from x Â Â a plus (ii) above easily.
Assumption (c) of Theorem 1 holds by construction.
Finally, let us show that condition (d) of Theorem 1 holds. Consider any two elements
x;y 2 X such that x Â Â y. Then either x = z Â y or there is z 2 X with x Â Â z Â y.
Clearly, we are done if we justify the existence of r1;r2 2 Q such that r1 > r2, z 62 Gr1,
y 2 Gr2, whatever the case holds. Let us de¯ne the set A(z) = ft > 0 : x Â Â tzg. It
is non-empty by (i). And it is bounded above: since z is not minimal, there is t0 > 0
such that t0z ÂÂ x by (i), and now acyclicity of Â prevents the existence of t arbitrarily
large with x Â Â tz because of condition (ii). Denote ¸0 = sup A(z). Since Â is tc-upper
semicontinuous, we have that ¸0 62 A(z) due to the continuity of scalar multiplication.
We have thus shown ¸0z 62 G1, i.e., z 62 1
¸0G1. Let us check that ¸0y 2 G1, i.e., y 2 1
¸0G1.
Note that ¸0z Â ¸0y by homotheticity. Upper semicontinuity of Â Â grants the existence
of ²0 > 1 with ¸0z Â Â (¸0²0)y, therefore
¸0
²0 z Â Â ¸0y. By de¯nition of ¸0, x Â Â
¸0
²0 z Â Â ¸0y
and so ¸0y 2 G1. Now ¯x any rational number ¹ r2 such that 0 < ¸0 < ¹ r2, y 2 1
¹ r2G1; such
a number exists by upper semicontinuity of Â Â and continuity of scalar multiplication,
since we have that ¹ x Â Â ¸0y. Now let ¹ r1 be any rational number such that ¸0 < ¹ r1 < ¹ r2.
Then ¹ r1z 62 G1 from the de¯nition of ¸0. Finally, set r1 = 1
¹ r1 and r2 = 1
¹ r2. Hence, we have
that r1 > r2, z 62 Gr1 = r1G1, y 2 Gr2 = r2G1, and therefore condition (d) of Theorem 1
holds.
The ¯nal statement is immediate now, because in fact the stronger condition (b) is
satis¯ed if we select the element in (iii) and proceed as before. ¤
The next result builds on Property 3 and is interesting for abstract choice theory:
PROPOSITION 1 Given a multivalued choice structure (B;c) on a real vector space
X such that all subsets of X with 3 or fewer elements belong to B: it is rationalizable by
a homothetic preference if and only if WHA holds true.
Proof: The necessity of the condition is plain (in fact, we have justi¯ed that SHA must
hold in Property 3).
22Conversely: provided that WHA is ful¯lled, then F solves the problem. Indeed,
i) F is complete: given x;y 2 X then x 2 c(x;y) without loss of generality. Then xV y
and so xF y.
ii) F is transitive: given x;y;z 2 X such that xF y F z, denote A = fx;y;zg 2 B. Should
we have x 2 c(A) then xV z and so xF z. Otherwise, two options remain:
(a) y 2 c(A); then y V x and so y F x. By WHA, x 2 c(A) and the reasoning above
applies.
(b) z 2 c(A); then z V x and so z F x. Again, WHA yields x 2 c(A) and we proceed as
above.
iii) F is homothetic by construction.
iv) F rationalizes (B;c); that is, c(B) = fx 2 B : xFy for all y 2 Bg. Indeed, for any
x 2 c(B) one has xV y and so xF y, whenever y 2 B. Conversely: let x 2 B with
xF y for all y 2 B. Because there is z 2 c(B) and then xF z, the WHA axiom implies
x 2 c(B). ¤
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